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As is one atom,
So in all atoms,
All worlds enter therein –
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Preface
The history of Buddhist philosophy is rich with debate and disagreement,
but this paper will focus on the particular school of thought known as the
Madhyamaka, or Middle Way view. This perspective, widely regarded as the
apex of Buddhist metaphysics, charts a centrist path between the extremes of
material realism and nihilism. The work of Nagarjuna, the Madhyamaka’s
original architect, will be our primary source for understanding the concept of
emptiness, though a small amount of Chandrakirti’s later commentary will
provide additional support. Further research was conducted through interviews at
various monasteries in Boudhanath, Nepal.
Finally, this paper orients the Madhyamaka in terms of contemporary
thinking in Western physics and cognitive psychology. The answers it provides
require a considerable paradigm shift away from the reductionism that
characterizes scientific inquiry, though the holistic alternative they present has
been gaining support in a number of fields. I believe it is a perspective from
which the West has much to learn. Likewise, it will be interesting to see how
Buddhist doctrine holds up as the cognitive sciences advance in their
understanding of the mind and its relation to the brain. I anticipate a long and
fruitful continuation of this dialogue that is now well under way.

I.
Emptiness

Introduction

Our experience of the world is populated with a wide range of phenomena
– things like physical objects, forces, emotions, and people – all of which appear
to be substantial entities that exist in a very real sense. When you eat your
breakfast there is a thing that you consume, there is a thing that consumes it, and
then there is a process (another thing) that it undergoes during which it is
transformed into more things still. Though the relationships between these things
are clear, we maintain rigid distinctions between them and conceive of them as
separate and independent phenomena that each deserves its own ontological
ground. This form of realism is founded on the notion that all phenomena
possess at their core some essence, some immutable substance in which the
phenomena’s intrinsic identity is contained and which serves as the bearer of
whatever attributes the phenomena displays.
This assumption, while seemingly commonsense, is understood in
Buddhist thought as the greatest and most insidious delusion to plague the human
mind. It is a natural misconception – after all, the phenomena we experience
affect us in tangible ways: fire burns us when we touch it and a slab of wood
taken to the face is going to raise a welt. The fact that these experiences are so
compelling, however, is a distraction from the fact that neither the fire nor the
wood exist as such. When inspected analytically, all phenomena – everything
from galaxies to atoms to people – are ultimately empty of the identities we treat
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them as having. They do not exist as independent entities which can be isolated
and understood sui generis, but rather as momentary forms whose existence is
entirely dependent on their relationships to other phenomena and the conceptual
labels we impute upon them.
At first glance the idea of emptiness as the ultimate nature of things seems
to invite charges of nihilism. It appears as if Buddhists are dismissing the whole
of reality as mere illusion, as if it were some phantom masquerading above the
great void of nothingness which alone deserves our attention. On face value this
is a valid objection: if nothing truly exists, then what is this all around me? There
is clearly something here, so how is it that this something arises from nothing? If
the ultimate nature of things is emptiness, then how are there things in the first
place to have this nature? These questions, though sensible, arise from a
misunderstanding of what is meant by emptiness. Such a view treats emptiness
itself as existing in terms of having an essence, as if there were truly some void
out there with the phenomenal world floating above it like mist. Admittedly it is
easy to be so misled when terms like “ultimate nature” are employed, but as we
shall see, emptiness itself is just as empty as anything else. This is the
cornerstone of the Madhyamaka that allows it to maintain a balancing act between
the two extremes of material realism, the view that all phenomena exist inherently
and independently in and of themselves, and nihilism, the paradoxical view that
nothing exists. In the end we are left with a worldview in which emptiness and
form, truth and delusion, are as interdependent as the phenomena they describe.

2

The Conventional Level

According to the Madhyamaka, there are two perspectives by which we
can understand phenomena, one of them being their ultimate nature and the other
being the conventional paradigm in which we live our daily lives. This is what is
known as the Two Truths, for neither takes ontological primacy over of the other
– it is simply that we are only aware of the one. In order to get a firm grasp on
what is meant by emptiness, we will first examine the conventional level and
identify the assumptions we make about the nature of phenomena. Once this is
established will we be prepared to dig deeper into their compositions and
demonstrate how said assumptions are unfounded and how all phenomena are
ultimately empty of inherent existence. Finally, we will turn to the emptiness of
emptiness in order to rescue us from nihilism and unite the Two Truths into the
coherent centrist philosophy known as the Middle Way.
Let us begin with a tree. When we look at a tree we are aware of its many
components – its branches, leaves, roots, and so forth – but in general we
conceptualize their unity as forming the basis for a greater object still: an identity
that begins at the furthest tips of its roots, continues to and includes the outermost
atoms of its entire surface, and penetrates completely through to its core. We can
stand back, look at the structure as a whole, and say “that tree exists.” Now what
do we mean we use the verb “to exist”? Jay Garfield in his commentary on
Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way says that for a thing to exist in terms of
3

our general understanding of the word it would have to “have an essence
discoverable upon analysis, for it to be a substance independent of its attributes,
[and] for its identity to be self-determined by its essence” (315). To perceive
phenomena as existing in this way is to perceive them on the conventional level,
the first of the Two Truths. This is how the vast majority of us spend our entire
lives experiencing the world: we conceptualize it as being composed of distinct,
independent phenomena which can be isolated and understood non-relationally as
entities which exist inherently by their own natures. We are aware of the various
causes that bring these phenomena about and the other phenomena with which
they interact, but we perceive sharp discriminatory borders between them and
understand them as separate and coherent concepts.

The Ultimate Level: A Physical Approach

There are multiple arguments in the Madhyamaka tradition that are used to
demonstrate the emptiness of phenomena, a few of which we will examine in due
time, but it is prudent that our first line of attack be conducted in a language with
which we are more familiar – namely, the science of physics and its quest to
unravel the material world. Since as early as the Greeks, philosophy has been
asking the basic question of “What is reality?” in the form of “What kind of stuff
is it made out of?” Democritus and Leucippus hypothesized that there was this
thing called the atom and that it was the most basic building block, and when our
4

microscopes first caught sight of those little storms we rejoiced in our discovery
of the bricks-and-mortar of the universe. As we probed deeper, however, we
found them to be composed of even smaller particles. Those particles turned out
to yield the same curious results, and now, despite the creation of multiple and
increasingly powerful particle accelerators with which scientists have repeatedly
collided subatomic particles at ludicrous speeds and searched for new ones in the
carnage, no substantial, indivisible object has been located that could feasibly
give matter its substance. Despite our effort, we have found only a very colorful
nothing.
This being said, our search’s failure by no means implies its futility.
Perhaps we just have not dug deeply enough. Matthieu Ricard, however, a former
physicist and presently a monk and the French interpreter for the Dalai Lama,
presents a compelling argument as to why the existence of an indivisible
elementary particle is a logical absurdity. Suppose we have such particles – how
then do they combine to construct matter? It seems safe to say that they can do so
by either coming into direct contact with one another or by maintaining their
distance but relating in some other way. If they touch, and say the west side of
one particle touches the east side of the other, then we are dealing with objects
which are still divisible and thus not elementary. As long as we are conceiving of
these particles in three dimensions we will always confront this problem.
If we are to avoid it, these particles would have to only exist in one
dimension and thus be mathematical points. This, however, generates some
problems: if the particles are points, then when they touch the whole of one would
5

be in contact with the whole of the other, and thus both points would fuse into
one. In such a model the construction of any macroscopic structure is impossible
– we would have the whole universe fused into a single point. If the particles did
not touch, however, and they were held together by something akin to the strong
and weak nuclear forces present in the current model of the atom, then the
distance between them becomes nonsensical. The locations of two non-touching
one-dimensional points can only be related by positing at least another dimension,
and since points are merely theoretical constructs and occupy no space at all, the
distance between these two points would stretch into infinity. Thus the relative
scales of size we perceive in the world would lose their foundations, and we could
in theory have the entire universe situated between two particles. Consequently,
the entire concept of an elementary particle is implausible and it is only through
emptiness that forms can arise (Ricard 4/16).
So let us return to our tree. We were last talking about its treeness: the
underlying essence that gives it its identity as that particular tree. Where then can
we find this treeness? The intuitive answer is that it arises from its parts, and not
just from a few of them but from all of them when they are combined and
arranged in a particular way. Notice now that we have already retreated inward to
define the tree in terms of its constituent components, which are, of course, just
more objects that need explaining. What then makes up their essences, and the
essences of their components? No matter how deeply we penetrate into the tree,
everything will stubbornly remain divisible into something smaller. If we look at
the wood we find that it breaks down into its cells, the cells break down into
6

mostly cellulose and other polymers, the cellulose is composed entirely of
glucose, and we know the story from here.
After such a descent, how can we say that there is any thing there which
we can call a tree? We have found nothing of substance to bear this label.
Instead we have found an infinitely complex series of relationships and
interdependencies: the tree only exists in terms of its parts, those parts only exist
in terms of their parts, and so on ad infinitum. With no essence we can say that
the tree does not exist inherently, and is thus empty. This is not to say that tree
does not exist at all, for clearly there is some form to be perceived, but it is to say
that the treeness of this form, its supposed identity, is merely an arbitrary and
artificial concept which we have foisted upon it. The tree is empty of inherent
existence or exists only in terms of other things, which in Madhyamaka terms is
to say that it is dependently arisen. On a conventional level there is some form
called a tree, but any analytic search for the ultimate essence of that form will
come back empty-handed.
Of course, this same line of reasoning is not limited to trees but applies to
all phenomena – even immaterial things like emotions are empty since they are
never found without relations to other things. Anger requires a subject, an object,
the particular causes that brought it about, and of course the mind that experiences
it; there is no such thing as pure anger blazing somewhere on its own. The
relationships that define phenomena are likewise empty because they rely on the
objects they relate to exist. If one examines them no concrete thing can ever be
isolated and identified – you would simply find particular causal relationships and
7

orientations which are by definition inextricably connected to their particular
causes and effects.

The Emptiness of Emptiness

So far we have ducked beneath the first extreme of material realism, the
belief that phenomena exist on their own by means of their essences, but where
does this leave us? What sort of monster have we invoked? To say that all
phenomena are empty appears to be asserting an intuitively-unacceptable
metaphysical nihilism. If nothing exists, then what am I looking at? From what
do all these wonderful colors, sounds, and emotions I experience arise? In
addition to the protests of perception, emptiness as ultimate nature seems to
generate some contradictions. When we employ concepts like dependencies and
relationships we necessitate the existence of at least two characters – for after all,
how can nonexistent entities be related? How can a relationship exist if the
objects it relates do not exist to begin with? It seems that the concepts on which
emptiness depends are rooted in exactly that which it denies.
All of these questions, however sensible they may seem, are rooted in the
same faulty reasoning that Buddhism is trying to dissolve. The trick is to not treat
emptiness as if it were a real void, some ultimate property that defines the true
essence of phenomena. If we do this we are treating emptiness as if it existed
inherently, despite the fact that we cannot explain what this would even mean,
8

and we have substituted one essence for another. When we searched for the
essence of the tree and found nothing, it wasn’t that we found a nothing as if that
nothing were a thing to be found, but rather that we simply did not find the tree; it
was a wholly negative statement. The tree’s emptiness is merely a concept used
to characterize the dependent nature of that tree – we imputed it artificially in just
the same way we imputed the concept of the tree as a whole in the first place.
The tree has no inherent existence or essence, but this lacking is not itself a thing
but simply the fact that the tree is only a convention – it is the way that the tree
exists.
That said, we can see how the emptiness of the tree is dependent on the
tree to exist and is thus empty itself! Furthermore, that emptiness is dependent on
the previous emptiness and thus empty, and so on ad infinitum. We are not
talking about the disappearance of the phenomenal world but rather the ultimate
manner in which it exists. As Garfield says in that same commentary, “Emptiness
is not different from conventional reality – it is the fact that conventional reality is
conventional” (316). We cannot talk about its ultimate nature because to use
language is to employ concepts and thus reify it, restricting ourselves to the
conventional level. Thus a true and lasting understanding of the ultimate nature
of phenomena can only be realized experientially through meditation. This is by
and large the purpose of Buddhist spiritual practice.
Now we reach the most essential concept of the Middle Way and
understand what is meant by the phrase “Form is emptiness, emptiness is form.”
All phenomena are empty in that they do not exist inherently but only in relation
9

to other phenomena, but likewise emptiness can only be understood in relation to
the particular phenomena it describes. Thus we have avoided both extremes of
essentialism and nihilism and have arrived at a unity of the Two Truths. The real
Truth is half truth and half lie – they are like the two sides of a coin or a mobius
strip, inseparable and inexplicable without the other. The ultimate reality of
things and our misperceptions are themselves interdependent, and thus the nature
of the world is both form and emptiness, being and nonbeing, inextricably
intertwined.

Arguments for Emptiness in the Madhyamaka

1) The Refutation of Causation

Now that we’ve been through the concept as a whole the traditional
authors of the Madhyamaka may be easier to approach. The first argument for
emptiness we will examine is a reductio in which Nagarjuna, the Madhyamaka’s
most central proponent, examines the process underlying causes and their effects
and demonstrates that here too no essence can be found. The argument goes as
follows: if a phenomenon comes into being, we can say that its causes can have
one of four possible relationships with their effect:

1) The causes are the same as the phenomenon (meaning they share the
same essence)
2) The causes are different from the phenomenon
3) The causes are both the same and different as the phenomenon, or
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4) The causes are neither the same nor different than the phenomenon.
(Donden 4/15)
We can immediately throw out the third possibility since it is a
contradiction, and we can likewise toss the fourth since it is either a contradiction
as well or is to be interpreted that the phenomenon is uncaused and springs into
being spontaneously. Additionally, we can eliminate the first possibility since it
is circular: if the causes of the phenomenon are identical to the phenomenon itself
then the phenomenon would have had to have existed prior to its own origination
in order to bring itself about. This leaves us with the model that most people take
to be true: effects are brought about through causes which are something other
than themselves.
Nagarjuna, however, finds this option equally untenable. In the first
chapter of his Treatise on the Middle Way, states that the…

Essence of entities
Is not present in the conditions, etc….
If there is no essence,
There can be no otherness-essence (I:3).

The first two lines point to the fact that no essence can be satisfactorily
located in causes of phenomena. A burn is not present in fire and a welt is not
present in the slab of wood used to draw it out. What is meant by the final two
lines is that if phenomena depend on their essences from other objects, and if no
such essence is present in those objects, then since there is no other place from
which that essence could come it follows that phenomena arise without an
essence. Having lost this they thereby lose the basis by which they can be
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differentiated, since interdependent phenomena are really just the same thing.
Given this lack of difference the notion of obtaining one’s essence from another
becomes absurd since there are no true others from which this essence can be
obtained. Therefore it is impossible for phenomena to come about by virtue of
causes different than themselves since this would result in an internal
contradiction (Garfield 112).
Having refuted our model of causation Nagarjuna is then forced to
explain, at least in some sense, the pattern of cause-and-effect we perceive in the
conventional world. In the end he does not do this in a way that we would find
fully satisfactory, but since he believes phenomena are ultimately nonexistent to
begin with his obligations here are considerably lessened. Rather than point to
explicit causes that bring about their effects through some enigmatic occult
power, Nagarjuna instead appeals to the various “conditions” that precede an
effect to explain its appearance without ascribing them any active involvement in
the process. Thus fertile soil, steady sunlight, and a strong water supply are the
conditions necessary for the growth of our tree, but none of them are causes in the
sense that they exert some power to provoke the tree’s growth. Regularities and
logical consistency are what count.
When pressed about why regularities exist at all, Madhyamaka
philosophers point out that they are only intelligible in reference to larger
regularities and that the question is ultimately unanswerable: “The fact of
explanatorily useful regularities in nature is what makes explanation and
investigation possible in the first place and is not something itself that can be
12

explained. After all, there is only one universe, and truly singular phenomena, on
such a view, are inexplicable in principle” (Garfield 116). Thus our final outlook
is a typical Madhyamaka stance: on the conventional level we may acceptably
suppose active causal powers in the conditions necessary for an effect, but
ultimately no such powers exist – in the end our explanations are grounded on a
mythical system built from a consistency we perceive in nature. Any attempt to
decode this consistency will, if undergone long enough, climb higher and higher
into further consistencies until it reaches the outer limits of the universe, at which
point our metaphysics hit a wall and become arbitrary.

2) The Refutation of Motion

Next, let us look at an argument that both Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti, a
later Madhyamaka philosopher who wrote a commentary to Nagarjuna’s Treatise
and reinforced many of its ideas, discuss in order to further elucidate the nature of
empty form. This argument, based on our conventional understanding of
inherently existing phenomena, shows that motion under such a view is
impossible. In the second chapter of his Treatise Nagarjuna explains that:

What has been moved is not moving
What has not been moved is not moving.
Apart from what has been moved and what has not been moved
Movement cannot be conceived (II:1).

The premise here is that if objects can move then this motion should exist
at a certain point in time. One could not say that the motion exists in the past,
13

since by definition such events are no longer happening – we would consider this
to have been a different motion, one that has ceased to exist. Likewise we cannot
say that the motion exists in the future since by definition it has not yet come
about. There is, however, no third period in which it could take place because the
present is an infinitesimal, elusive thing that cannot be located or quantified – it is
like a slide on a ruler that occupies no width. As Mark Siderits explains in his
commentary of the text, “there is no present going apart from the gone over and
not yet gone over, just like the flame of a lamp” (8). This candle-flame analogy is
used again and again to exemplify the state of constant change in which form
exists: we talk of the flame as if it were a stable and singular object that moves,
but in reality the flame is a different object at each moment. Thus there is no
motion but a continuity of different but causally-linked entities across time.
Nagarjuna says:

A thing itself does not change.
Something different does not change.
Because a young man doesn’t grow old,
and because an old man doesn’t grow old either. (I:5)

In other words, since time is infinitely divisible and everything in a state
of constant flux then no stable entity can ever be pinned down so that we could
say it exists. This is easy to grasp with such ephemeral things as fire but it applies
mutatis mutandis to all phenomena. We can apply conceptual labels to things like
chairs because from our perspective their change is too slow to perceive, but this
says more about our relative scale than it does about chairs themselves. As
14

Matthieu Ricard points out, “The speed doesn’t change the nature of the change.
[A chair] is no more permanent than a lightning in the sky – it is a slow-moving
lightning” (Ricard 4/16). Thus there are no persisting identities but an infinite
continuity of change from which discernable forms are arbitrarily carved.

3) No Self

Finally, let us examine the famous Sevenfold Reasoning, an argument
Chandrakirti introduced to demonstrate the absence of a true self or ego. This
argument is often seen with a chariot as its focus, but due to the profundity of the
point and its importance to Buddhism we’re going to take it the whole way.
Additionally, although it logically follows that the self would be included in our
discussion of the emptiness of all phenomena, I think it deserves a little special
treatment seeing as how there are few things which to us seem more real. That
said, the argument follows the basic format of trying to isolate and identify the
inherently existing person in relation to the body and mind. When all the
possibilities have been exhausted and no such thing can be found, it follows that
our self-perception as separate and autonomous individuals is an illusion – we are
just interdependent as anything else.
Assuming the self exists, Chandrakirti gives seven possibilities for its
relationship to its parts. These parts, hereafter unexplained, are typically thought
of us as things like the body, the conscious will, memories, sets of character traits,
and so on, but they can include anything you yourself would qualify as an
essential characteristic of your identity. These seven possibilities are as follows:
15

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

The self is the same as or equal to its parts.
The self different than its parts.
The self is dependent on or exists by virtue of its parts.
The self is based on or contained in its parts.
The parts are based on or contained in the self.
The self is the collection of its parts.
The self is the proper shape or arrangement of its parts.

Many of these will be surprisingly easy to dismiss. Firstly, if the self were
the same as its parts then it would have to be either equal to them on an individual
basis or equal to them as a whole. If it were equal to them each individually then
we would have to say that the self is many, which is clearly not the case.
Furthermore, if the self were equal to the sum of its parts then we would be forced
to admit that we were someone new every time we clipped our finger nails, ate a
meal, or a had a new thought. This isn’t what we have in mind when we think of
a self, however – our notion of identity is something that persists through change.
Next, the self cannot be something different from its parts because then we
would somehow be able to apprehend it as existing separately from them.
Theoretically we should be able to strip all the parts away and still have the self,
which is something we can’t do. Furthermore, the self can’t depend on or exist by
virtue of its parts because to do so would entail difference, mutatis mutandis for
the self being based on or contained in its parts and the parts being based on or
contained in the self. Additionally, the self cannot be the collection of its parts
because this would allow us to dismantle it, rearrange the parts in any gruesome
order, and still call it the self. This makes no more sense than dismantling a
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chariot, tossing its wheels and handlebars into a shiny brass heap, and then
readying the horses for a ride.
Finally we are left with the possibility that the self is the proper shape or
arrangement of its parts. If the self can be reduced to a shape, then it is a kind of
physical thing – a precise arrangement of particles. This, however, leaves out all
the mental, non-physical components such thoughts and values. How are things
with no shape to be included in this geometry? If you’re a materialist and you
believe that all of mind can be reduced to neurons and electricity then so far so
good, but as we similarly noted in the first possibility this option would freeze a
wholly-physical self into some fixed statue incapable of change: the loss or
addition of even one particle would constitute a change in identity. As we know,
people gain and lose weight, dye their hair, and get tattoos – not to mention the
fact that our bodies are constantly refreshing their cells. Even if you consider the
shape to be a pattern through which the parts are recycled – like the way a
whirlpool exists in a stream despite never containing the same water for longer
than an instant – this pattern, being fixed by definition, would not be able to
account for the changes humans are known to undergo (Chandrakirti 83-84).
Furthermore, the notion of the self existing as something independent is
still untenable. Conventionally that whirlpool may persist, but ultimately it’s just
a concept available from our perspective, something totally dependent on its
components and circumstances for its existence – and beyond that there isn’t even
a stream. You as a persona exist in a conventional sense like the tree or the chair
or the candle, but if you start digging through the layers in search of some gem
17

that you could tweeze out call yourself you’ll find only bridges arching out in all
directions, interdependencies that criss-cross to various forces and histories until
your ego gets lost in the webbing. After all, as Alan Watts once pointed out, the
shape of your body depends just as much on the strength of your bones as it does
on the pressure in the air (128).

18

II.
Consciousness

Descartes and His Critics

The mind-body problem, or the question of exactly how the mind and
body interact and exist in relation to one another, was first formulated explicitly
by the French philosopher René Descartes. In his book Meditations on First
Philosophy, Descartes set out to jettison all of his knowledge and assumptions and
see what could be known from absolute square-one. Though in doing so he
became skeptical about the existence of the external world, he concluded that the
existence of his mind was an unquestionable fact. This assertion, famously
expressed through the phrase “I think, therefore I am”, became the basis for the
position that would later be named Cartesian dualism in his honor. This title
technically refers to a particular idea about how the mind and brain interact, so for
the purpose of this paper we will more generally refer to it as substance dualism.
In a nut shell, substance dualism is an ontological statement that posits the
existence of two distinct substances: the external physical world, which contains
our bodies and the various objects of our sense perceptions, and the internal
immaterial world of consciousness in which the immortal soul or self, free will,
and creative power of human beings reside. This distinction is based on a
fundamental difference in the qualities these two worlds seem to possess: physical
objects, being objects in the way we typically think of the word, have qualities
like mass, location, extension, and velocity. Mental phenomena, however, cannot
be described in these terms. They have a subjective, colorful aspect that seems to
set them in a class all their own. It makes no sense to say where in the world
16

anger or the taste of salt exist, and they certainly can’t be said to occupy any
space or be moving at a particular speed. According to Descartes, consciousness
exists independently of the body in an entirely immaterial way. Despite this, it
exerts causal power over the brain, its seat in the physical world, and the brain is
likewise permitted to exert causal power over consciousness by feeding it sense
data. In a dualist model the body and mind are ontologically distinct and of
fundamentally different natures, but their constant interaction is a necessary
feature of their relationship.
In general, this is the model most people adopt whether they’re aware of it
or not. You can see it in our language when we say things like “my body”, as if
the physical body were a possession of some true identity that exists higher up.
Despite its pervasiveness, however, substance dualism has been out of fashion in
the philosophical and scientific communities for quite some time. Damning
charges have been laid against it on purely philosophical grounds, but the most
devastating blow has been the extraordinary precision with which modern
neuroscience has been able to correlate mental states to particular neural
configurations and biochemical processes. With so much of our conscious
experience accounted for in the physical mechanisms of the brain, many in the
field now see no need for this separate and enigmatic mind entity. The mind
appears to be what the brain is doing, and nothing more. It is an epiphenomenal
consequence of biological activity. This answer to the mind-body problem,
known as physicalism or materialism, is not without its own hang-ups, but for the
moment let us take a closer look at the charges physicalists have put forth against
17

substance dualism and examine the various ways in which this kind of monism
purports to answer these problems.
The first crack in the dualist’s armor is perhaps the most obvious – if the
body is material and the mind immaterial, then how can they possibly interact?
How is it that something with no physical properties can produce a change in a
physical system? What is the nature of the force it exerts, and how is it not by
definition physical if it can cross this basic boundary? Additionally, the idea of
dualistic interactions seems to violate the law of the conversation of energy, one
of physics’ most sacred tenets: if consciousness is indeed some entity that exists
externally to the physical world, then any force it exerts on that world would
constitute an intrusion of unaccounted-for energy. The same objection applies
when we consider from whence consciousness arises. If we adopt the view that
consciousness is produced by the brain, then we are forced to confront the
question of how matter produces an immaterial thing without violating this
principle. If some chemical component is consumed in the production of
awareness, this departure of the physical into the non-physical would constitute an
unacceptable loss of energy. If nothing is consumed and consciousness is simply
a thing that emerges by virtue of neural activity, then we are effectively talking
about something arising from nothing. It would be a production unlike anything
seen in nature (Wallace 182-183).
In addition to this problem of interaction or the “explanatory gap”, a
serious threat to substance dualism stems from advances in the cognitive sciences
and their ability to account for nearly all mental phenomena on an anatomic level.
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Everything that happens in the mind appears to be a direct reflection of what
happens in the brain: we have specific lobes for vision, motor control, emotional
responses, and even abstract reasoning. Scientists have reliably demonstrated
precise correlations between location and function to the degree where a separate,
thinking spirit no longer seems necessary – the brain as a mechanism seems
explanatorily sufficient for all mental processes and capabilities. The spirit-like
mind substance, now superfluous, has been discarded, and the problem of
interaction disappears. To the physicalist, consciousness is an emergent property
(and impotent bystander) of what has become the main event: a complex organic
computer that undertakes the entire effort of the human experience on its own, the
whole process operating in deterministic clockwork according to the laws of the
physics. Free will is thus an illusion, a necessary consequence of seeing the world
from the machine’s perspective. However laborious it may feel, the sensation of
making a decision is simply the experience of your brain processing information
and outputting the consequent signal. Your mind is what your brain is doing.
Things are much simpler from this perspective, but at the end of the day
the ontological equivalence of mind and matter is intuitively quite difficult to
accept. Reducing the mind to the brain to the point where mental states literally
are brain states seems to leave out the rich character of our phenomenological
experience – after all, there is something that it is like to see the color red or smell
curry, and these qualitative phenomena (referred to as qualia) appear to be
profoundly removed from the interactions of neurons. We may demonstrate a
one-to-one correlation between qualia and the brain states that underlie them, but
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simply by virtue of their subjective character qualia seem to cry out for
ontological independence.
Frank Jackson’s thought-experiment known as Mary’s Room expresses
this sentiment particularly well: imagine a brilliant neuroscientist named Mary
who was born in and has never left a black-and-white room in which she uses a
black-and-white computer to study all there is to know about the neurophysiology
of color perception. Assume that she truly knows all there is to know about what
goes on in the brain during the perception of colors. The question is this: if Mary
were to leave the room and perceive colors for herself, would she gain new
knowledge beyond what she already understood from studying the
neurophysiology of the experience? Assuming that she would (and there is
contention on whether or not this assumption is a fair one), Mary’s experience of
color as something new would ontologically distinguish qualia from brain states
in a decisive way. To say that she would learn something new is to say that her
information about the experience was incomplete; but given that she knew all
there is to know about the brain states of perceptual experience, it follows that
there is something more to the mind than what physicalism asserts (Jackson).
Finally, the most profound objection to physicalism is perhaps the fact that
it renders consciousness entirely pointless. If the physical brain can function as
an information processing device independent of some ghostly awareness, then
why does it not do so? If it can perceive and make decisions without involving
some other entity then why is there conscious experience at all? Why doesn’t it
all go on in the dark? It seems far simpler for organisms to have evolved without
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consciousness if the physical brain is explanatorily sufficient for life. After all,
consciousness is a serious thing for evolution to have produced without need – the
magnitude and unlikelihood of such a grand cosmic accident rules it out with
considerable certainty. We cannot deny the existence of consciousness because
we experience it each moment – indeed, there may be nothing of which we can be
more certain – so to relegate it to epiphenomenal status as if we wish it would
vanish for the sake of our theories seems a remarkably foolish line of reasoning.
Put simply, the sheer profundity of consciousness suggests a bigger role than
physicalism allows.

A Buddhist View of the Mind

1) Definition and Origins of Consciousness

At least on the conventional level the Madhyamaka adopts a stance
Western philosophy would quickly identify as a form of dualism. At the Mind &
Life Institute, an organization of Western and Buddhist scholars and scientists that
have been exploring the relationship between Buddhism and cognitive science,
the Dalai Lama has accepted the possible one-to-one correlation between neural
and mental activity. Nevertheless, Buddhism maintains the distinction between
the brain and the mind it supports. Consciousness from their perspective is
literally nothing more than awareness – the simple act of knowing. As Alan
Wallace, a philosopher of science and member of the Mind & Life Institute, has
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written, “The mental gymnastics come in only when we try to define this firsthand
event in terms of non-cognitive physical processes, configurations of matter,
abstract behavioral dispositions, emergent properties of the brain, and so on”
(178). The urge to further define consciousness stems from our tendency to reify,
but in doing so we distort a simple phenomena with an inappropriate set of
concepts. Consciousness is entirely first-person and experiential – it cannot be
found out there in the world like some sort of light, and to conduct such a search
is to erroneously conceive of it in terms of physical objects. It is not something to
be apprehended in the way one apprehends a tree or an emotion, but is simply the
apprehension itself.
Of course, this does not answer the questions of how this apprehension is
possible or how it is brought about. The key is to look at what the these questions
are actually asking in our Western context: the first is more properly expressed as
“How is it that inanimate matter can know itself?” and bears the physicalist
assumption that matter is a primary phenomenon and consciousness is secondary
or epiphenomenal. The second question should be read as “What is the nature of
the process by which consciousness emerges from matter?” This question, in
speaking of an origin, is again founded on the idea that matter is primary.
Furthermore, both questions betray the additional and more subtle assumption that
matter, along with all other phenomena, exists inherently in and of itself in an
objective external world. The emptiness of consciousness will have dramatic
implications for understanding the mind-body problem, but for now let us answer
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these two questions from the Buddhist perspective and explore their definition of
mind as it exists on the conventional level.
Firstly, Buddhism would dismiss the question of how matter can know
itself on the grounds that it is not matter that is doing the knowing.
Consciousness, at least conventionally, is to be understood as a separate and
distinct phenomenon that joins matter at conception, exists in parallel to it
throughout the life of the organism, and departs at death to be reborn in a new
form. Consciousness is thus a primary phenomenon in the sense that its
experiential perspective provides us with the basis for all cognition and endures
beneath the passing of each particular thought: if we conceive of thoughts as
individual clouds, then consciousness would be the sky in which they arise, exist,
and dissolve. It is described as a basic “luminosity”, or that which illuminates the
inanimate world, and should not be confused with a feature the inanimate world
itself (Tenzin 4/26).
Where then does consciousness come from? Western psychology
hypothesizes that it emerges from nervous systems when they reach a certain level
of complexity, but the details of this emergence remain a complete mystery.
Science has no concrete definition of what consciousness even is, and accordingly
has no method for detecting its presence in the external world. Buddhism avoids
this problem entirely and rejects the notion that matter gives rise to consciousness
on the grounds that they are fundamentally disparate phenomena. From the
Buddhist view there is such a profound difference between the two that admitting
that one could give rise to the other would necessitate the admission that anything
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could arise from anything else; they have no substantive link. Additionally,
Buddhism rejects the notion that consciousness could arise spontaneously and
without cause on the principle that such an occurrence is impossible for any
phenomenon.
If consciousness does not arise from matter and does not arise ex nihilo,
then it follows that all streams of consciousness exist without beginning. Any
given moment of consciousness, Buddhism argues, could only have been brought
about by the moment of consciousness that immediately preceded it. Thus by
necessity Buddhist cosmology posits a universe with no beginning, each continua
of consciousness having experienced an infinite number of lives in an infinite
number of forms. The Western mind recoils at this infinite regression, but in truth
we are a bit unjustified in this reaction – Christianity inexplicably exempts God
from the causal chain of being, and cosmologists can only speculate about what
preceded the Big Bang. With no solid alternative of our own, it seems a
beginningless universe is just as good an answer to the first-cause problem as any
other.
This model begs the common questions of where these mind-streams
existed before the universe became hospitable to life, but Buddhism responds that
there is no principle that restricts rebirth to the same species, world, or even
universe. The Buddhist cosmos are infinite in every respect: they exist without
beginning, have no spatial boundaries, are populated by an infinite number of
sentient beings on an infinite number of worlds, and will continue without end.
To propose otherwise would be to contradict the doctrine of emptiness, since
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anything that begins or ends must exist inherently, and reality as a set with a finite
number of members would as a whole constitute an inherently existing
phenomenon.

2) Three Levels of Awareness

Madhyamaka philosophers regard consciousness as being composed of
three distinct levels: the gross, subtle, and very subtle. Though similar divisions
exist in Western psychology such as Freud’s subconscious and Jung’s collective
unconscious, the notion of a tiered consciousness may seem alien to Western
thinkers. Buddhism however claims that these divisions are empirically visible
through advanced meditation (though such an “experiment” is only accessible to
those willing to make the effort). These three levels of mind as a whole do not
combine to form some greater thing called the mind or the soul, but are in fact
separate processes. At a meeting of the Mind & Life Institute, the Dalai Lama
described consciousness not as a singular entity but as a “multifaceted matrix of
events” (Gyatso 40). Nevertheless, they are all three accessible by any given
being. Additionally, each level differs in its dependence on the brain: the gross
level is entirely determined by neural processes, the subtle level is based on the
brain but achieves some freedom, and the very subtle level, the most fundamental
of the three, is completely independent from physical form.
First let us examine the crudest of the three: the gross level of awareness.
This level is quite simply the contents of perception. It is our bare sense data as
they exist below conceptual identification or abstract thinking of any kind. It is
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thus entirely dependent on the brain and determined by the biochemical activity of
our sensory pathways. Second in the hierarchy is the subtle level of awareness
which consists of the mental activity with which we are most frequently engaged.
This is all forms of conceptual thinking such as language, object recognition,
philosophy, decision making, daydreaming, etc. This subtle level is tied to the
brain in that its concepts are based on sense data, but Buddhism regards the
concepts themselves and the flow of conceptual thinking as being immaterial
phenomena that function outside the realm of neural processes. 1
The third and final level of awareness, the very subtle, is the deepest and
most basic member of what we would call consciousness. Known as rigpa or
“pure awareness” in the tantras, it is the fundamental light of mind that perceives
reality directly without conceptual obscurities. In his classic The Tibetan Book of
Living and Dying, Sogyal Rimpoche describes rigpa as “simply your flawless,
present awareness, cognizant and empty, naked and awake” (50).
In contrast to conceptual thinking, which is described as a monkey frantically
leaping from branch to branch or “a candle flame in an open doorway, vulnerable
to all the winds of circumstance”, rigpa is the unwavering clarity at the base of
mind that sees straight into the empty nature of phenomena and transcends the
1

It should be noted that the Dalai Lama is open to a possible revision of this stance if Western
science can adequately demonstrate a one‐to‐one correlation between conceptual thoughts and
corresponding brain patterns. At a Mind & Life conference he stated that “If there is strong
evidence that suggests the absence of a thing – even certain things that are asserted in Buddhist
canon, the original words of the Buddha himself – even then, these words are to be interpreted
on the basis of valid evidence, and not to be accepted at their face value. In other words, we do
not adhere to the literal meaning of the Buddha’s words when they are refuted by valid
evidence” (Gyatso 48).1
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subject/object duality of self and environment (Rinpoche 47). It is the basic
Buddha-nature of all consciousness; though obscured by delusion like a sun
behind clouds, it exists fundamentally in all sentient beings. It is likewise the
mode of awareness that characterizes enlightenment.
Rather than consciousness arising from the gross biological level as
science hypothesizes, Buddhism asserts that it is this fundamental and completely
immaterial awareness that ultimately gives the gross and subtle levels their
foundation. These grosser levels depend on the additional physical system of
brain, body, and environment to become manifest, but without this basic spark no
awareness would be possible. At conception rigpa enters the fertilized egg, and
from this point forward the gross and subtle levels of awareness begin to develop.
It is at this point that a new being can be said to exist – before the arrival of rigpa,
the cells still belong to the parents.

3) Karma and Rebirth

During death it is said that the gross and subtle levels of awareness
condense into the very subtle level to the point where only rigpa remains. As the
grosser levels dissolve into their foundation and become dormant, carrying with
them all memories and conceptual thought, the dying person has an opportunity to
engage their exposed rigpa and achieve enlightenment. A person’s ability to do
this, however, depends on the awareness of rigpa they cultivated during their life
through spiritual practice: a skilled meditator could embrace this luminance and
pass into nirvana, however the majority of beings withdraw in fear when
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confronted with its immensity and remain in samsara. When the now-condensed
mind-stream finally disengages from its physical vessel, this incarnation is
conclusively considered dead. The mind-stream will then pass through the
intermediate realm known as the bardo before being reborn in its next body.
Beings are famously reborn as various creatures in accordance with the
karma they accumulated during their last life. Karma, which translates from
Sanskrit to nothing more than “action”, is a simple system of cause and effect:
every action spreads out from its agent like ripples in a pond, producing an equal
and opposite reaction from all phenomena it touches. (As an infinite number of
beings live out their lives in this fabric, reality is pierced through with an
infinitely complex web of causes and their effects, building and firing off each
other as they intersect.) Buddhism describes six realms of existence in which a
being can be born according to their karma: the god realm, the demigod realm, the
human realm, the animal realm, the realm of the hungry ghosts, and the hell
realms. At first glance karma may appear to be an absolute moral system by
which beings are judged and rearranged accordingly, but without a theistic
overlord to establish the moral code such a process would be arbitrary; after all,
virtue and malice are only intelligible relative to particular perspectives.
A better understanding of karma is to equate it with the general mental
disposition that beings develop over their lifetimes. This disposition, having
retreated into the very subtle level of consciousness, would continue into the
being’s next life and define the perspective with which it viewed the world. Do
we not project our gloom onto the world when we feel down and delight in the
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world when things are going our way? It is said that someone whose life was
characterized by a great deal of anger would be reborn in a hell realm, but this is
not to say that he or she would be appear in a literal place of fire and torture
devices: the hell this person would experience would be a negative state of mind
brought on by the weight of his or her habitual tendencies. The various realms are
not literal then but rather figurative descriptions of a state of being, much like the
Orthodox Christian notion of hell as a state of distance from God. Thus we have
no need for supernatural planes of existence – reality is infinite as it is, and the
various realms are flexible categories based on subjective modes of being.

Dissolving the Explanatory Gap

Though Descartes’ division was intuitive – both mind and matter are
apparent and meaningfully distinct – it rests on the faulty premise that each entity
exists inherently in an independent and self-determining way. Likewise, though
physicalism simplifies the discussion and absolves the problem of interaction, it
too falls prey to this assumption by treating matter as if it constituted an objective,
intrinsically-real external world – not to mention discounting the reality of inner
experience. However, when we cease reifying consciousness and its objects and
view them in light of their mutual emptiness, we retain not only the conventional
distinction we observe but render the problem of interaction nonsensical. On the
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ultimate level, there are no separate entities to interact but rather an
interdependent and inseparable whole whose internal relationships give it form.
One could easily think of consciousness as having inherent existence,
especially when we talk about this “basic luminosity” of rigpa, but to do so would
require that we somehow extract awareness from the phenomena of which it is
aware. Obviously no such act is possible: awareness cannot exist without being
aware of something, and this awareness is only intelligible with its object
included in its description. Additionally, concepts and conceptual thinking could
never come about without sensory input from an external world. Therefore we
can say that consciousness exists conventionally, but ultimately is empty of any
inherent essence by which it could be isolated and identified.
Furthermore, we can see that the external world arises in dependence upon
the consciousness that perceives it. Not only do physical phenomena depend on
each other for their structural characteristics, but they likewise depend on
conceptual designation for their identities as such. This is not to imply complete
external irrealism or idealism, the view that the external world is entirely invented
by the mind, but instead is to point out that a discriminatory perspective is
required to extract shapes from the infinite continuum of change that is reality.
This is likewise not a form of skepticism that would posit an objective external
world that exists beyond our limited conceptual perspective, because anything in a
constant state of change can never be said to exist in a certain way. If we recall
the example of the chair we see that no form can be carved out on any objective
basis – the chair as an object is only visible from our relative size, and its identity
30

as a “chair” is nothing more than a conceptual label that stems from our subjective
intents and purposes. A Martian or a gaseous sun-being would likely not identify
the chair as a “chair’, and perhaps would even reinterpret it according to their own
concepts and perceptual abilities as something entirely different. They would not
have mistaken the chair for something erroneous, for the chair does not exist in an
objective sense – the physical world relies entirely on its sentient inhabitants to
give it meaning.
In terms of the mind-body problem, however, we are not talking about
meaning – we are talking about existence in a strict ontological sense. How is it
that two incompatible substances can interact? This questions remains on the
conventional level since mind and matter are conventionally substantial and
distinct, but having just demonstrated their ultimate emptiness and mutual
dependence we see that the question is irrelevant. Mind and matter and are not
incompatible because they are not separate! If in trying to identify one we are
forced to include the other, we must therefore admit that they are essentially the
same thing. Thus the dichotomy between internal and external, self and other,
becomes nonsensical, and any self-identity we entertain must be extended to
include the whole of reality. By only existing in relation to other phenomena we
have no intrinsic basis by which we can be differentiated from anything else, and
if followed through this expansion spreads endlessly in all directions. By
ultimately not existing, we literally become one with infinity.
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Glossary of Terms
Material realism: The belief that phenomena exist inherently in and of themselves in an
objective external world.
Nihilism: The belief that nothing exists.
Substance dualism: The belief that consciousness and matter exist as separate but interactive
entities.
Physicalism: The belief that nothing exists apart from the physical universe. In philosophy of
mind, this implies that consciousness is entirely reducible to the brain and has no immaterial
existence.
Idealism: The opposite belief which states that mind is primary and that the physical world only
exists as a projection of consciousness.
Monism: The belief that all phenomena are reducible to a single substance. Both physicalism
and idealism are monist positions.
sui generis: By virtue of an essence.
ad infinitim: And so on, into infinity.
mutatis mutandis: Given their differences, the status of one phenomenon applies equally to the
another.
ex nihilo: Having arisen from nothing or by a Creator.
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Methods
This research was conducted using a combination of textual support and
interviews with Buddhist practitioners and students. The texts provided the
preliminary exposure to the concepts and arguments of the Madhyamaka, but the
series of interviews I conducted along the way deepened my understanding of the
numerous subtleties and sticking points.

Limitations
Though the various translations and commentaries that have been written
on Nagarjuna’s and Chandrakirti’s work provided thorough explanations of their
arguments, the fact that I was limited to these English translations kept me one
step removed from the original text. I doubt much was lost in the translation, but
the nuances inherent in Sanskrit and Tibetan could have provided valuable
insights. Additionally, the one month time period limited the depth of my studies.
A month was sufficient for a paper of this size, but anything more ambitious
would require more time.

Suggestions for Future Research
This research could be furthered in a great number of directions. For one,
the specifically Buddhist theories of mind could be more deeply explored. In
particular, the continuation of consciousness between rebirths and the formation
of concepts deserve a closer look. A comparison of the Madhyamaka and other
schools of thought such as the Yogachara would likewise be worthwhile.
Nagarjuna’s refutation of motion invites a closer look at the nature of time, and
the possibility of a consciousness entering a machine would have implications for
the field of Artificial Intelligence. Additionally, it would be interesting to
juxtapose the methodologies of science and contemplative practice in terms of
their epistemological merit.
Finally, the steady growth of cognitive psychology will inevitably produce
a host of insights which will either corroborate or contradict Buddhist doctrine.
Future researchers will thus be in a position to harmonize the two views or
conclusively demonstrate their incompatibility. Needless to say, either position
would be significant for thinkers in both worlds.
The author can be contacted at jamespianka@gmail.com.

